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Michelle Voss Roberts’ Dualities 
 
Laurel C. Schneider 
Chicago Theological Seminary 
 
DUALITIES  is an important book.  It 
represents a contribution to the field of Hindu 
Christian studies, but it also adds considerably to 
women’s studies in religion and to the emergent 
field of comparative theology. Michelle Voss 
Roberts has managed to treat with sensitivity 
and creativity two enigmatic figures, each from 
long ago and far away (from us and from each 
other), and each from two dramatically different 
religious traditions.  What is remarkable about 
this study is that Voss Roberts manages to 
introduce us to the basic shape of both of these 
women’s thought while at the same time 
pursuing a very contemporary, sophisticated 
stream of theological reasoning relevant to 
postmodern concerns about multiplicity, 
relationality and change as constitutive 
characteristics of divinity.  A dedicated scholar 
of either one of these figures—or of the tradition 
and time she inhabited—may object that Voss 
Roberts is dabbling in anachronism by putting 
her figures to work in a theological agenda that 
neither woman would recognize.  This is true.  
But the same can be said of biblical texts, 
patristic figures, and other ancient writers who 
labor in the pages of contemporary theologies.  
The fact that such use seems more obvious in a 
comparative theological project—due perhaps to 
the inevitable disjunctures between the 
philosophical and religious presuppositions at 
work between the different traditions and 
cultures—does not negate the mining of ancient 
texts for contemporary projects, it just 
illuminates the challenges of doing so. 
In a kind of poetic symmetry, Voss Roberts 
engages two main ideas in this project on two 
women from two different cultures and 
religions.  One is a critique of the error of 
contemporary philosophical conflation of 
dualism with duality.  Voss Roberts seeks to 
retrieve the notion of duality as a mode of 
differentiation that need not ossify into 
opposition, especially not into the insidious 
forms of oppressive dualist hierarchy that 
characterize patriarchalist gender formations and 
colonialist racial formations.  Differentiation is 
necessary to valuations of difference and 
diversity and, more fundamentally, it is 
necessary to cognition.  So the conflation of 
duality with dualism has put contemporary 
critiques (of Cartesian thought especially) into a 
“double” bind: they seek to heal the rift between 
mind and body, for example, at the expense of 
important distinctions between the two: a kind 
of miasmic swamping of differentiation that 
frankly contradicts the world of meaningful 
distinction that we experience.   
Secondly, Voss Roberts argues that duality 
can be redeemed from the clutches of dualism 
by virtue of its constitution in fluidity.  
Differentiations that recognize the co-
constitutive character of difference itself, 
meaning difference’s dependence upon relation 
for its coherence, necessarily constitute a flow of 
connection that cannot meaningfully be severed.  
This deep relationality in the very fact of 
difference eliminates dualism’s charade of 
absolute opposition.  And what her correction 
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offers to those of us who work philosophically 
in theories of multiplicity and relation is a means 
of thinking about the way that differentiation can 
occur in relation.  It is the means of getting from 
the irreducible interconnection of everything 
(deep relationality) to the irreducible 
inexchangeability, or difference of everything 
(deep heterogeneity) without setting up an 
opposition.  What I have been content to hold, in 
my own work, as a tensive relation between 
apparent, but productive contradictions, Voss 
Roberts has brought together by means of a 
pathway between them, a structure if you will, 
that makes the differentiation and relation 
between things both intelligible and non-
contradictory.  What is lovely about Voss 
Roberts’ argument is her grounding of this 
theory in the work of two medieval writers, 
Lalleswari and Mechthild.  Doing so keeps her 
work from losing its tether in tradition/s, even as 
she challenges traditional interpretation and 
presuppositions on so many levels.   
Given the emphases of my own work in 
multiplicity, it is not surprising that I gravitate 
first to Voss Roberts’ own thinking about 
fluidity, through which she connects Lalleswari 
to Mechthild and back again.  Her attention to 
this theme in both ancient writers suggests not 
only a model for comparative theology but 
points to an innovation across at least two major 
religious traditions that show each of these 
women to be implicit (and at points explicit) 
critics of the theologies of their own traditions. 
It seems that Voss Roberts has uncovered, by 
way of a particularly feminist comparative 
theology, both a theological idea (fluidity) that 
can be fruitfully developed in a comparative 
mode, but also a peculiarly gendered idea that 
sets both women in positions of some tension 
with the dominant voices and ideas of her own 
tradition, tensions that limit what each woman 
can do with her own insights.  I will pursue this 
intuition by way of a third comparison, from 
outside of either tradition with which Voss 
Roberts deals. I do this to remain, in part, in 
keeping with the comparative theological 
approach that Voss Roberts is using, and in part 
because there are a couple of important 
tradition-based presuppositions at work in both 
of her figures’ writing and in her own that are 
worth pushing a bit via, in this case, a “third 
way”.   
Both religious traditions—medieval 
European Christianity and medieval Hinduism—
with which Voss Roberts must deal in her 
navigation of Lalleswari’s and Mechtild’s 
writing share presuppositions of an ontological 
externality or givenness to reality. Christian 
thinking grants an external, or objective, status 
to God and the cosmos, realities that persist 
before—and after—human perception. And so, 
for Mechthild, God possesses an ontological 
aseity and existence that is unperturbed by 
worldly affairs; God is the true reality and exists 
in serenity apart from the shifting, shifty world.  
In Lalleswari's case, this external reality is Siva 
consciousness.  Human existence in its 
entanglements with delusion can only glimpse 
the solid reality, but misses again and again, 
prey to the ephemera of the world’s false 
certainties. Voss Roberts finds in both writers, 
however, a possibility of permeability that she 
develops into an idea of fluidity.  Fluidity via the 
duality that she is working out here is helpful for 
overcoming a reality-delusion or fact-fiction 
dichotomy that permeates the ontological 
presuppositions of both classical traditions.  I 
wonder, though, about the effect of assumptions 
of an even more thoroughgoing relationality in 
reality than these writers seem to entertain, and 
what might it contribute to understanding them, 
and to the project that Voss Roberts is pursuing.  
In other words, might the possibility of fluid 
duality that Voss Roberts sees at play in these 
writers be limited by their own acceptance of the 
assumption that that reality beyond the 
individual self is somewhat set (though fluidly 
expressive and fluidly experienced) and is not 
ontologically dependent upon the participation 
of the individual?  What effect might the 
introduction of a third assumption, namely that 
reality is the result of interactions and 
“agreements”, co-constituted by events and by 
stories, have on duality?  
If I understand Voss Roberts’ treatment of 
both Lalleswari and Mechthild, the external 
reality of Siva consciousness or of God's love is 
available to the individual or community, and it 
infuses them, flowing through and animating 
them, even perhaps creating them, but divinity is 
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not in any way co-constituted or brought into 
being by the individual or community’s 
interaction with it.  Whatever dependence Siva 
or God has on the community is as an 
embodiment of divine expression.  I assume 
that, in Lalleswari’s case, this is saying a great 
deal more about Siva’s relationship to 
individuals than Advaitism allows, and I know 
that, in Mechthild’s case it is saying much more 
than classical Christianity would claim for 
divinity.  Nevertheless, I wonder if fluidity runs 
into a solid wall at the base of the divine-human 
divide even in Voss Roberts’ generous reading 
of them.  What would happen if we entertained 
an even deeper sense of flow, a co-creative and 
co-constitutive dimension to the divine-world 
duality? 
I come to this question aslant, from my own 
comparative theological work with Native North 
American ontologies.  In particular, I have been 
recently working with Joy Harjo’s poetry and 
Gerald Vizenor’s philosophy as an avenue into 
this mode of theologizing.  I don’t want to take a 
lot of space and time for a third comparison 
here, but perhaps by saying a few things, I can 
contribute a question for reflection that may help 
us to engage Voss Roberts’ important work in 
another way. 
Harjo is a Muskogee poet from Oklahama, 
though of course the Muskogee people lived for 
a thousand years in the southeastern woodlands 
of what is now Alabama and Mississippi before 
Andrew Jackson drove them on death marches 
to the west.  Her poetry, like that of several other 
Native American writers, deliberately blurs lines 
between the Euro-modern notion of poetry “as 
art” and a less bifurcated view of poetry as 
metaphysical creativity, as invocational, as a 
power that participates sacramentally in the 
worlds that it helps to bring into being. This 
blurred understanding of poetry ignores early 
Protestant distinctions between art and the 
sacred and later scientific distinctions between 
art and reality, a distinction summed up by the 
18th century poet and literary historian Samuel 
Johnson who said that art, if it is any good, 
necessarily embellishes what the artist sees.  
Understood this way, all art is fiction, and that is 
Johnson’s point. “Poetry pleases” he claims, “by 
exhibiting an idea more grateful to the mind than 
the things themselves afford” whereas religion 
must concern itself exclusively with the truth.  
This is the reason, Johnson argues, that religion 
makes for bad art, and vice versa.1   
Aside from the more or less obvious 
apology for Protestant iconoclasm resident in 
Johnson’s early modern bifurcation of art from 
truth (which is not a small aside, but the 
Protestant dimension is not the direct subject of 
this essay) the dominant logic resident in that 
division makes the challenge of thinking 
theopoetically today to be all the greater.  If 
poetry is art, and art is fiction, then poetry is 
fiction.  The irony, or more accurately, the 
problem in this equation is that it only works if 
fiction is the opposite of truth—a lie—and if it is 
misrepresentation (both of which occur as 
synonyms in mainline thesauri).  The equation 
falls apart however if “fiction” means a 
particular mode of invoking, creating, or 
constructing the real.  This is a mode of duality 
that seems very much in keeping with Voss 
Roberts’ analysis, and congenial to the 
permeability that she finds so richly abundant in 
both Mechtild and Lalleswari. 
So let us take this permeability one step 
further.  In “A Postcolonial Tale” Harjo writes 
“Everything was as we imagined it.  The earth 
and stars, every creature and leaf imagined with 
us.”2   She writes poetry in a more or less 
conventional sense of the word.  But her 
“embellishments” on what she sees in the world 
are not exactly fictional in the modernist, 
dualistic sense that requires art qua art to be 
other than real or even representational, 
something other than presence – a deferral of 
presence at most. Within a logical framework 
that grants to nature an independence from 
human imagining (whether in the Newtonian 
sense of objective substances governed by 
universal laws or in the post-Kantian, 
postmodern sense of a nature/world so wholly 
independent from human imagining that it can 
only be imagined, which is to say fictionalized, 
or misrepresented) the possibility that 
imagination has substantive effect is nonsense. It 
is a lovely embellishment, a fiction, to say that 
everything was as we imagined it and actually 
mean the earth and stars, every creature and leaf 
imagined with us. Because of course we cannot 
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actually mean that, grant it some kind of 
objective truth.  But fluid metaphysics edges 
into the territory of such possibility.  Native 
philosophy, as Vizenor suggests, has always 
already been in that territory.   
The rationality that Harjo inherits perceives 
a world that is more malleable than the mental-
physical poles of traditional Christian or Advaita 
thought allow; it is less law-abiding than that, 
and this difference may be the stone on which 
Voss Roberts’ project stumbles if it pushes 
Mechtild and Lalleswari as far as I am 
suggesting that her construction of duality, at 
least, might go.  The philosophies of Native 
America describe some of the unruliness in 
reality that both Advaita and Christian 
philosophies eschew, but more than that its 
poetry and stories also implicate us in 
ontological unruliness.  Native American 
philosophy ascribes poeisis to poetry in actuality 
and as such casts possibility backward and 
forward precisely because it pokes holes in 
anything solid and ushers productive ambiguity 
in, not just in language, as if language is merely 
a mode, but in actuality, at least in those realms 
that understand that stories must be told in 
season, and carefully, because the story itself, 
the poem, makes and breaks the world.   
The challenge of framing a concept of 
fluidity that does not simply slide back in to the 
logic of the One is a challenge not only of 
recognizing the duality at play in the flow 
between the cognitive and the material, but I 
suggest that it also means the touchy matter of 
the sacramental – which Lalleswari’s and 
Mechthild’s treatment of the body also suggests.  
Regina Schwartz gives a very tidy summary of 
the problem that faces Christian theologians, 
which is also a problem of the metaphysics that 
produced impassible otherness of the divine in 
both Hindu and Christian thought.  She 
examines the “disastrous separation” of divinity 
and world–indeed a dualism if there ever was 
one–in terms of its effect on sacramentality, 
which can be a helpful way for us to think in 
practical terms about an ontology of fluid 
multiplicity.  Looking at the history of Christian 
doctrine in terms of sacraments, she identifies 
this dualism as a problem of secularist logic.  
More precisely (I would argue) it is a problem of 
the logic of the One in practical terms.  Schwartz 
writes: 
 
“God’s body cannot be here and at the right 
hand of the Father,” said a logic of physical 
space that trumped the sacred space of 
sacramentality.  “Man [sic] cannot eat God” 
said a logic of human physiology that 
[turned] a deaf ear to the liturgy of 
sacramentality….  “A priest cannot sacrifice 
God” claimed a logic of authority that 
denied the mystery of sacramental 
agency….  “A sign can only stand for, that 
is, stand in for what it signifies, which is 
necessarily absent” said a logic of 
representation that defied the participation 
of the sign in its referent.3 
 
The participation of the sign in its referent 
demands a logic of permeability that defies an 
absolute separation of world and divinity.  And 
“sacramental agency” also demands a certain 
malleability, fluidity, or porosity in the world 
(and its spirits) that Voss Roberts’ nondualist 
notion of duality supports.  She is mining hints 
of this logic in Lalleswari and Mechtild, a logic 
that I am simply suggesting is full-blown in the 
philosophies of Native America.  It is a 
presupposition of creative relationship between 
the theologian-storyteller and a world that never 
listened to the secularists to begin with – a world 
that never divested itself of divinity and so never 
had to justify or mourn the loss of the gods in 
the world, the way that Schwartz argues the 
European and American moderns did.  
Lalleswari and Mechtild both predate the 
disastrous separation between sacred and secular 
in modernity that Schwartz decries, but they 
write—unconsciously, perhaps—against its 
impending, gathering force.   
Voss Roberts sees them resisting this 
dualism through their attention to the body. She 
notes, “Lalleswari and Mechtild can speak to 
each other, and to us, because they speak to 
somatic experience” and in this experience is 
divinity.4  These are poets working at the 
margins of a world who dominant wisdom 
severs the body from divinity. Lalleswari, 
Mechtild, and Harjo all reveal a mode of 
reasoning that is not beholden to Thomistic or 
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Kantian limits.  The trouble is, these limits make 
it as difficult for us to approach Lalleswari and 
Mechthild as it is to approach Native America.  
More than its emphasis on somatic experience, 
the nonduality at work in all of these writers is a 
mode of reasoning that, in terms of native 
America, anishinaabe philosopher Gerald 
Vizenor has dubbed “native modernity.”5 
Concerned primarily with survivance (by 
which he means “an active sense of presence”) 
of native peoples beyond the tragic non-actuality 
of a non-history called by the misname “indian,” 
Vizenor argues for a much trickier nomenclature 
for the “storiers of native modernity.”  He builds 
his argument on Louis Dupré’s observation that 
“[c]ultural changes, such as the one that gave 
birth to the modern age, have a definitive and 
irreversible impact that transforms the very 
essence of reality.  Not merely our thinking 
about the real changes: reality itself changes as 
we think about it differently.  History carries an 
ontic significance that excludes any reversal of 
the present.”6  Native survivance is therefore not 
merely a tattered picking-up of the traditional 
pieces in the brutal aftermath of colonial 
devastation, a nostalgic “reversal of the effects 
by returning to premodern premises.”7  What is 
relevant in Vizenor’s development of native 
survivance to Voss Roberts’ treatment of 
Lalleswari and Mechtild is its attention to “an 
active sense of presence.” The comparative link 
between these two ancient women and native 
philosophy is ontic signification that takes 
seriously the reality-changing aspect of devotion 
– the co-constitutive character of theology that 
sees fluidity as a metaphor for reality “all the 
way up and down”. 
Implied in the permeability of reality on 
which the concept of dualities rely is, I suggest, 
a sacramental agency that understands the ontic 
significance of speech, poetry, and stories.  Art – 
speech – imagination – does much more than 
describe, embellish, or lie about what is already 
there.  Art – speech – imagination – storytelling 
also creates what is there.  This is anathema to 
Euro-modern dualist thought and its logic of the 
One.  It takes somatic experience seriously, and 
involves multiplicity that is far beyond the realm 
of numerical reckoning, and into the realms of 
shape-shifting, responsive, and excessive 
process – the capacity for reality to respond to 
our words, for us to respond, rhizomatically, to 
the world.   
For example, Harjo’s thinking of love as the 
“very gravity that holds each leaf and star 
together” is not that far from Mechthild’s notion 
of divine eros.  In both cases, a form of natural 
theology is suggested – gravity as love/love as 
gravity, creation pulled together in desire.  But 
in neither case is natural theology in a reductive 
sense adequate to describe what is going on in 
the different cosmologies/metaphysics being 
engaged.  A part of what is distinctively shared, 
at least as I am suggesting it here, between 
native modernity and these medieval poet 
theologians, is an openness to actual presences 
that make a kataphatic difference without 
reversion or reduction to a problematically 
substantive stasis. 
Harjo begins “A Postcolonial Tale” with the 
stanza “Every day is a reenactment of the 
creation story.  We emerge from dense 
unspeakable material, through the shimmering 
power of dreaming stuff.”8  The mode of 
reasoning at work here is utterly serious about 
the claim, also in this poem, that “earth and 
stars, every creature and leaf imagined with us.”  
And yet this is not a reductive rationality.  She 
concludes with  “No story or song will translate 
the full impact of falling or the inverse/power of 
rising up.”  If a new theological sensibility is to 
apply here at all, it means something else 
altogether than a mechanistic conflation of 
“nature” with design.  The chancy, excessive, 
poetic dimensions of reality disrupt the dualism 
carried in ontologies that fundamentally separate 
the reality of the divine from the creativity of the 
world out of which divinity, perhaps, comes.  
Every day, brimming over with divinity, our 
stories re-enact creation, become-in the context 
(out of) the dense dreaming stuff.  They make us 
and the world.  This is a narrative, imaginative, 
ontically significant claim, and it is 
unintelligible to a metaphysics of solidity.    
As I am suggesting here, other modes of 
reasoning exist (than the logic of the One, that 
is) that have never required “presence” to 
instantiate static, unverifiable substance prior to 
linguistic or narrative implication. They do not 
assume language, narrative, and story to be inert 
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building blocks and tools for reporting, memory, 
or instruction. In other words, these other modes 
of reasoning do not assume language, narrative, 
and story to be disembodied, without agency on 
their own, Perhaps there is a fundamental 
tendency in book-cultures toward the negligent 
idea that language and narrative can be reduced 
to utility and thereby bound (as in shelved.) The 
error lies in forgetting the innate agency of 
stories, their capacity to be bound for something, 
for mischief and creation beyond any 
storyteller’s ability to predict or manage. Ontic 
significance co-implicates story and presence(s), 
assuming a world-creating aspect to narrative 
that cannot be restricted or entirely managed. 
But this idea is intelligible only within a mode 
of reasoning that begins with fluidity or more 
specifically does not presume a prior logic of the 
One wherein an ontological separation between 
truth (as one) and fiction (as multiple) must be 
rigidly maintained.9  
Dualities gives us a powerful argument for 
staying with the tensions that have so often been 
sundered by dualism.  In that spirit, I am 
fascinated by the ways that two women from 
such divergent cultures, religions, and times can, 
in essence, speak across the limits of their own 
cultures and times to our own, bearing gifts of 
an alternate logic that resists the “disastrous 
separations” of spirit and body, divinity and 
world, truth and art.  As this exploratory essay 
reveals, my own comparative work lies in native 
North American traditions, in which the 
ontological assumptions are quite different than 
in European Christianity or in Indian Saivism or 
Advaitism, although native North American 
philosophies, like the voices of ancient women 
writers in Europe and India, are muted by 
prejudice, genocide, and missionary overlay.  
Nevertheless, there are interesting resonances 
between the theopoets of native North America 
and these two theopoets of medieval Europe and 
medieval India, especially in light of the 
richness of the fluidity metaphor that Voss 
Roberts has developed.  The plural that Voss 
Roberts has placed on “duality” is brilliantly apt. 
There is more to divinity than One, there always 
has been.  But—and this is the crux of 
“dualities”—there is more to duality than two (I 
have offered, experimentally, a third.)  This is 
the challenge of Lalleswari and Mechtild read 
together in service of a contemporary, 
constructive theology. Voss Roberts is onto 
something here, she is pulling a thread that 
strings a tapestry.  It is worth seeing where it 
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